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THE GRASP OF LONG ARM JURISDICTION
FINALLY EXCEEDS ITS REACH: A
COMMENT ON WORLD- WIDE
VOLKSWAGENr CORP. V WOODSON
AND RUSH V SAVCHUK
MARTIN

B. Louist

Two recent United States Supreme Court cases-WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchukhavefurther highlightedthose minimum contacts necessary to
avoid the due process limitations on state court jurisdiction.
ProfessorLouis assertsthat these cases shouldendpriornotions
that minimum contacts analysisinvolved afluidbalancingof the
co-equal interests of the plaintif,the defendant and the forum
state. Instead,the Courthas now made clear its requirementof
voluntary contacts by the defendant with the forum state as a
thresholdtest before consideringthe interests ofthe plaintyfand
the state. Anticioatingan academic assault on the Court'sposition, Professor Louis examines the spec4icfactors relevant in
the minimum contacts analysis appliedby the Court in the line
of cases beginning with Hanson v. Denckla and continuing
through the Court's recent pronouncements in World-Wide
Volkswagon Corp. and Rush, andjustjfes the bright-line approach taken by the Court in these cases as one necessaryto end
the inexorablegrowth ofstate long armjurisdictioninherent in a
balancingtest that would allow a state court to weigh local interests in assertingjurisdiction.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The period between 1945 and 1977 was one of unparalleled expansion for state judicial jurisdiction. In the first twelve years of that
period, the United States Supreme Court announced and then signifit Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B. 1956, Princeton
University; LL.B. 1959 and LL.M. 1965, Harvard University. I wish to express my gratitude to my
colleague, Stewart Jay, who gave generously of his time and made many helpful suggestions during the preparation of this Article.
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cantly expanded the reach of the minimum contacts test.' Thereafter,
the states seized the initiative, enacting and extending their long arm
statutes under the Court's silent but seemingly approving gaze.2 Only
once during this period, in Hanson v. Denckla,3 did the Court find that
a state had gone too far. But that 1958 decision stood alone for almost
two decades, and the rigid, old-fashioned, territorially derived view of
jurisdiction it espoused4 was increasingly regarded as aberrational and
of limited precedential value.5 Indeed, the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Black in Hanson,6 and the fluid interest analysis it set forth,
were regarded by many as a more reliable harbinger of the direction in
which both jurisdictional and choice-of-law theory were evolving and
would eventually reunite.7
By 1975, the evolution was almost complete.' State courts everywhere confidently probed the limits of due process and generally found
them to be just a little farther on.9 And, in the name of local needs and
interests, some courts unhesitatingly assumed jurisdiction over and applied their own law to the foreign acts of nonresident defendants whose
contracts with the forum state were at best "minimal" rather than
"minimum."'" Then the Supreme Court suddenly broke its silence of
1. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. See generally Currie, The Growth ofthe Longrm." Eight Years ofExtended Jurrdie/1on in
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-.4rm Jurisdictionin California Under
New Section 410.10 of/he Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163 (1970); Comment,
Long.4rm and Quasi ni Rem Jurisdictionand/he FundamentalTest of Fairness,69 MICH. L. REv.
300 (1970).
3. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). For a discussion of this decision, see text accompanying notes 19-33
infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 19-33 infra.
5. See D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL,
CASES AND MATERIALS 241 (4th ed. 1979).
6. 357 U.S. at 259-60 (dissenting opinion).
7. Jurisdiction and choice-of-law were once both dominated by considerations of territorial
location and power. Thus jurisdiction could be asserted only over persons or property found
within the state, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), and the law of the state where the transaction or occurrence took place usually was applied. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 377-397 (1934). Both managed to slip this tight leash and seemed destined to reunite
under the new balancing approach.
8. In St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148, 155 (W.D. Va. 1966), the court said:
It is possible that the law is moving more and more toward the idea that choice of law is
jurisdictional and that the fact that the law of the place is applicable provides the minimum contact necessary to permit the state to exercise inpersonamjurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
9. For a review of some of these case developments, see Comment, The Long-4rm Reach of
the Courts Underthe Effects Test4fter Kulko v. SuperiorCourt, 65 VA. L. REV. 175 (1979), and the
articles cited note 2 supra.
10. E.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
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almost twenty years and in four consecutive cases held that a state
court had exceeded the limits of due process." More importantly, it
rejected the more expansive interpretation of the minimum contacts
test, separated jurisdictional from choice-of-law theory and reestablished the former upon the rock of Hanson v. Denckla and its simple
verities.
These decisions and the fundamentalistic approach to the minimum contacts test they embrace run counter to much of the current
scholarly thinking in this area l" and will undoubtedly draw much critical fire. The decisions are not without their justifications, however,
which I would like to explore before the inevitable assault upon them
begins. By 1975, state long arm jurisdiction and choice-of-law doctrine
had enjoyed three decades of unimpeded growth towards, and arguably
sometimes beyond, the limits of due process. 3 Furthermore, this inexorable growth process was one the states inherently favored and were,
therefore, unlikely to stunt voluntarily.' 4 Consequently, that task inevitably fell to the Supreme Court, which chose to redefine, or perhaps
merely further explicate, the meaning of the minimum contacts test. In
doing so the Court sought to reconcile two often conflicting goals. The
new approach obviously had to achieve results that were generally fair,
just and reasonable. In addition, however, it had to be sufficiently clear
and workable such that the states, despite their contrary self-interest,
would effectively be bound by it or could easily be held to it. Otherwise the Court could be overwhelmed by a multitude of factually diverse cases asserting jurisdiction, most of which it could not find the
time to review.
In my opinion the Court's new approach is a fair and workable
one that strikes an appropriate balance between these two goals. To
demonstrate this proposition, I shall first briefly review the decisions in
Hanson v. Denckla, Shaffer v. Heitner,"5 Kulko v. Superior Court, 6
1034 (1978); Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). See
generally Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 79-90, 97-98

(1978).
11. Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100
S. Ct. 559 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186

(1977).
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37, Comment a (1971).
See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
See text accompanying notes 164-67 infra.
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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and Rush v. Sa'chuk. 18

Thereafter, I shall offer some tentative explanations and justifications
for them.
II.
A.

THE CASES

Hanson v. Denckla 9
In 1935, Mrs. Donner, while living in Pennsylvania, created a Del-

aware inter vivos trust. Years later, while living in Florida, she executed a power of appointment over the trust assets and a last will and
testament containing a residuary clause covering any property subject
to a power of appointment that she had not effectively exercised before
her death.2" Upon her death a Florida probate court found that the
power of appointment was invalid2 and that the trust assets, therefore,
would pass under the residuary clause. The court had jurisdiction over

the principal beneficial appointees under the terms of the invalidated
power and over the residuary legatees under the will. 22 The question

presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Florida probate court
had jurisdiction over the Delaware corporate trustee, which was found
23
to be an indispensable party under Florida law.

A majority of the justices answered in the negative. Florida lacked
jurisdiction in rem over the trust assets because they were located in
Delaware, where the trust had been established by the settlor and administered by the trustee.24 More importantly, Florida also lacked ju17. 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
18. 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
19. For extensive discussions of this case, see Kurland, The Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdictionof State Courtsfrom Pennoyer to Dencka."A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. Rcv.
569, 610-623 1958 and Scott, Hanson v. Denck/a, 72 HARV. L, Rav. 695 (1969).
20. 357 U.S. at 238-39.
21. Since the appointment executed by the decedent lacked testamentary formalities, its validity depended upon the validity of the inter vivos trust, which was itself subject to question
because of the almost unlimited control the decedent had reserved over it. 357 U.S. at 253; Kurland, supra note 19, at 620 n.273; Scott, sutpra note 19, at 697-698.
22. Under the power of appointment, the bulk of the trust's assets were to pass to two other
Delaware trusts for the benefit of two of the decedent's grandchildren, both of whom resided with
their mother, the executrix of the decedent's will, in Florida. The rival residuary legatees, who
had petitioned the probate court to resolve the question, were daughters of the decedent and aunts
of the rival grandchildren. 357 U.S. at 239-40.
23. Id. at 254-255. The Florida Supreme Court had left this question open. Hanson v.
Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378, 385 (Fla. 1956). Arguably, it was improper for the United States
Supreme Court to decide this question of state law. Kurland, supra note 19, at 616; Scott, supra
note 19, at 705.
24. 357 U.S. at 247-49. The Court went on to say:
[A] State acquires no in ren jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of Miter vivos dispositions simply because its decision might augment an estate passing under a will probated
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risdiction in personam over the trust company, which neither solicited
nor transacted business there other than to correspond with and remit
trust income to the settlor.2 5
In dissent, Mr. Justice Black emphasized the substantial relationship with Florida of the rival claimants, the decedent, her estate and
the locally executed power of appointment. Florida was, therefore, "a
reasonably convenient forum for all" 26 and one whose law could appropriately be applied to the controversy. 7 The majority opinion, in
reply, rejected all these considerations as unpersuasive, if not irrelevant, because they were based upon relationships with the forum of
persons other than the defendant trust company.2 8 Consequently, even
though these relationships arguably made Florida the most convenient
location for litigation and the "center of gravity" for choice-of-law purposes, they could not support an assertion of in personam jurisdiction
over the trust company, absent its own minimum contacts with the fo29

rum.

The Delaware courts, which possessed in rem jurisdiction over the
trust assets, had in fact exercised it in parallel proceedings. ° Thus,
Florida's assertion of jurisdiction was not based upon necessity. 3 ' Furthermore, the Supreme Court may have regarded probate courts as less
desirable forums to resolve the validity of foreign trusts and other
analogous transactions because of their possible interest in increasing
the size of the estate for local death tax purposes.3 2
in its courts. If such a basis of jurisdiction were sustained, probate courts would enjoy
nationwide service of process to adjudicate interests in property with which neither the
State nor the decedent could claim any affiliation.

Id
25. Id. at 251-54.
26. Id. at 258-60 (dissenting opinion).
27. Id. at 258 (dissenting opinion).
28. Thus the majority concluded:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendis essential in
ant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. . . . [I]t
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.
Id. at 253-54.
29. Id. at 254.
Lewis v.
30. Hanson v. Wilmington Trust Co., 119 A.2d 901 (Del. Ch. 1955), affd sub nora.
Hanson, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
31. Cf.Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (state of a trust's
creation and administration has jurisdiction to terminate potential in personam claims by numerous beneficiaries against the trustee for mismanagement when no other state has jurisdiction over
all the parties).
32. Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate." A SuggestedAnalysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121, 1174-75 (1966); see E. CLARK, L. LUsKY & A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS:
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In sum, Hanson laid down a traditionally oriented, straightforward test for jurisdiction that one commentator has described as "a
workable and not unduly confining expression of the limitations of the
Due Process Clause. 3 3 Nevertheless, between Hanson's announcement in 1958 and the Court's next decision in 1977, the case's authority
was increasingly regarded as suspect, and most of its principles had
either been discounted or ignored, as the lower court decisions in some
of the cases to follow will illustrate.
B. Shaffer v. Heitner 4
Plaintiff, a shareholder in a Delaware-chartered corporation,
brought a derivative suit there against a number of the corporation's
officers and directors, none of whom had any personal or business contacts with the state." Consequently, jurisdiction was asserted over
most of them by sequestering their stock in the corporation.36 They
appeared specially to make a due process challenge to this assertion of
jurisdiction and eventually prevailed in the United States Supreme
Court, which held, in an historic opinion effectively overruling Pennoyer v. Nff 37 and Harrisv. Balk,38 that assertions of in rem, as well
as in personam, jurisdiction were governed by the minimum contacts
test.39
If the Court had then simply remanded the case to the Delaware
courts to determine whether such minimum contacts were present,40 the
decision would not be very significant for this discussion. The Court,
however, went on to examine the contacts itself and found them lackWILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS, CASES AND MATERI-

ALS, 657 n.3 (2d ed. 1977).
33. Kurland, supra note 19, at 621.
34. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
35. Id. at 189-90, 213.
36. Id. at 190-92, 196. Delaware, unlike other states, provides by statute that the situs of
shares in a locally chartered corporation is in the state, regardless of where the certificates are
located. See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1974). As Justice Stevens intimated in his concurring opinion, this statute itself might have been declared unconstitutional. 433 U.S. at 217-19
(concurring opinion).
37. 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that judicial seizure of property within the state supports
jurisdiction over its owner on any cause of action, however unrelated to the property).
38. 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (upholding jurisdiction over a person on any cause of action in any
state in which a debtor of that person is found and the debt is garnished).
39. 433 U.S. at 212. The literature reviewing this historic aspect of Shafer is vast. Seegener.
ally Silberman, supra note 10; Smit, The Importance fShaffer v. Heilner: Seminal or Minimal?,
45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 519 (1979).
40. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that a remand was appropriate because Delaware had
not addressed this question. 433 U.S. at 220-222 (dissenting opinion).
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ing in terms harking back to Hanson v. Denckla. Delaware, it con-

ceded, had a strong interest in supervising the management of a
domestic corporation.4 ' That interest, however, while sufficient for
choice-of-law purposes, "does not demonstrate that appellants have
'purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State' . . . in a way that would justify bringing

have simply had nothing
them before a Delaware tribunal. 4Appellants
' 2
to do with the State of Delaware.
Justice Brennan purported to agree with the majority in principle,4 3 but dissented on the determination that Delaware lacked minimum contacts. He reviewed Delaware's strong interest in the
governance of a corporation it had chartered and concluded that "when
a suitor seeks to lodge a suit in a State with a substantial interest in

seeing its own law applied to the transaction in question, we could
wisely act to minimize conflicts, confusion, and uncertainty by adopt-

ing a liberal view of jurisdiction, unless considerations of fairness or
efficiency strongly point in the opposite direction."' Thus, he concluded, such "practical considerations argue in favor of seeking to
bridge the distance between the choice-of-law and jurisdictional inquiries."4 5
6

C. Kulko v. Superior Court of California4

Mr. and Mrs. Kulko lived in New York with their two children. In
41. Id. at 214-15.
42. Id. at 216 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). The opinion also
suggested that Delaware, which unlike other states lacked a long arm provision specifically asserting jurisdiction over the officers and directors of domestic corporations, had failed to assert clearly
its alleged interest in their activities and, therefore, to warn them of their attendant assent to its
jurisdiction. Id. at 214-16. Justice Brennan in dissent, id. at 226-27 (dissenting opinion), and numerous commentators, e.g., Silberman, supra note 10, at 65-67, have questioned the wisdom of
introducing this formal factor into the due process equation. Nevertheless, the idea was reiterated
in the Court's next jurisdictional decision in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978).
43. 433 U.S. at 219-20 (dissenting opinion). Interestingly, he misstated the position of the

majority in purporting to agree with it in principle, asserting that a state may assert extra-territorial jurisdiction "on the basis of minimum contacts among the parties,the contested transaction
and the forum State." Id. at 220 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). The majority, by contrast, had referred to the "relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation" as "the
central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction." Id. at 204 (emphasis added). This seemingly subtle difference is in fact the nub of their disagreement because a consideration of the
interests of persons other than the defendant opens the way to the balancing of interests approach
that Justices Black and Brennan advocated in Hanson. See text accompanying notes 26 & 27
supra.

44. Id. at 225-26.
45. Id. at 225.
46. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).

NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 58

1972 they separated, and she moved to California. Later that year, she
returned to New York to sign a separation agreement providing for
divided custody and partial support of the children. 47 She then obtained a Haitian divorce and returned to California, where she subsequently remarried. In December 1973, just before a school vacation
during which the children were to visit their mother, the younger child
told her father that she wished to live with her mother. He acquiesced
and accordingly bought her a one-way airplane ticket to California. In
1976, the older child, without his father's knowledge or consent, also
arranged to join his mother in California.48
A month later, the mother brought an action in California seeking
to obtain permanent custody of the children and to increase the amount
of child-support she received.49 The father appeared specially and
challenged California's jurisdiction solely with respect to the support
claim. The California courts, however, held that in sending the
younger child to that state the father had caused an economic effect in
the state and had "purposely availed himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of California."5
The Supreme Court reversed. While conceding that "the interests
of the forum state and of the plaintiff in proceeding with the cause in
the plaintiffs forum of choice are, of course, to be considered," it
averred that "an essential criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality
and nature' of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and
'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that State."'" It agreed
with the California Supreme Court that jurisdiction could not be based
on defendant's participation in the original visitation arrangements.
Otherwise parents would eschew such agreements lest they be subject
to jurisdiction in the state of visitation. 2 In addition, said the Court,
such a rule would violate Hanson's admonition that the unilateral activity of persons having a relationship with the defendant does not satisfy the requirement that the defendant himself make contact with the
47. The children were to reside with their father in New York during the school year and
with their mother in California during school vacations. The mother was to receive $3000 a year
per child as support. Id. at 87.
48. Id. at 87-88.
49. Defendant apparently had not increased the support payment for his daughter after she
had moved to California. Id. at 88.
50. Id. at 88-89. The California courts further held that, because they had jurisdiction over
this support claim, they could then reasonably also resolve the related claim with respect to the
older child.
51. Id. at 92.
52. Id. at 93.
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forum state.
The Court, however, rejected the finding that defendant's acquiescence and participation in his younger child's permanent move to California was a sufficient affiliating circumstance. Otherwise jurisdiction
54
would depend, to the detriment of harmonious family relationships,
upon whether defendant "bought his daughter a ticket or instead unsuccessfully sought to prevent her departure. ' 55 Furthermore, the
daughter's ability then to avail herself of various California public
services was a benefit to her, not defendant, and not one he had purposely sought. 6 Finally, the Court held that the application of the socalled "effects" test5 7 to this situation was unreasonable and unfair because the child, unlike a projectile or commercial papers,5 8 had not
been purposefully or beneficially sent to California by defendant, who
had himself remained in the state of the marital domicile.5 9
In closing, the Court stated that California's obvious interests in
the children's welfare, though sufficient for choice-of-law purposes, did
not make it a "fair forum. . . in which to require appellant, who derives no personal or commercial benefit from his child's presence in
California and who lacks any other relevant contact with the State, either to defend a child-support suit or to suffer liability by6 1default."6 In
any event these interests were protected in other ways.
Kulko's mildly worded opinion seemed to break no new doctrinal
ground and provoked no real controversy, 62 even though three justices
dissented briefly on the merits. It did, however, call into question many
53. Id. at 93-94.

54. Id. at 94.
55. Id. at 98.
56. Id. at 100-01.

57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971) provides:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects
in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from
these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the
state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
58. Firing a bullet or mailing contracts or insurance policies across state lines are, the Court
indicated, classic examples of the application of the "effects" test. 436 U.S. at 96.
59. Id. at 96-97. For citation to and discussion of many of the cases employing this test, see
Comment, supra note 9.
60. 436 U.S. at 100-01.
61. Most states, including California and New York, have enacted some form of uniform act
that facilitates the interstate procurement and enforcement of child-support decrees in such situations. Id. at 98-99. Indeed, the Court may have feared that this comprehensive legislative solution could be undermined by a contrary decision creating as precedent for the inevitable cases to
follow a colorable jurisdictional claim against any supporting parent who responds more humanely than prudently to such a custody situation.
62. Only a few casenotes of the decision were published. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 9.
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lower court decisions holding that foreign acts having local effects

would confer jurisdiction even though, as many long arm statutes require, the defendants had no other regular, continuous or ordinary contact with the forum.6 3 Although in hindsight the decision is totally
was emerging, it gave only a hint of
consistent with the doctrine that
64
the storm that was to follow.
D.

65
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson

While moving from New York to Arizona, plaintiffs were injured

in Oklahoma when their automobile, which had been purchased in
New York, was struck in the rear and caught fire. They brought a
products liability action in Oklahoma against the car's manufacturer,
its importer, its regional distributor and its local dealer, asserting jurisdiction under a typical "foreign act-local injury" long arm provision. 6
The Atlantic regional distributor and the New York dealer, neither of
which had any other connection with Oklahoma, unsuccessfully challenged this assertion of jurisdiction over them in the state courts.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The concept
of minimum contacts, began the Court, is intended primarily to protect
a defendant from the unfairness of litigating in a distant forum and to
prevent states from improperly asserting their sovereignty beyond their
boundaries, which retain jurisdictional significance in the context of
our federal system of government. 67 Thus, it asserted:
[T]he Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment inpersonam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." . . . Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of
another State; even if the forum state has a strong interest in apply63. 436 U.S. at 98-99. Some courts, however, distinguished Kulko and continued to employ
the "effects" test to acquire jurisdiction in questionable circumstances. E.g., Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'don other groundssub nora. Leroy v.
Great Western Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979).
64. One law review caught the hint and correctly anticipated the decision in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson denying jurisdiction in the "portable tort" type case. Comment,
supra note 9, at 187.
65. 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
66. Id. at 563 n.7. These statutes normally require that a defendant regularly engage in or
solicit business within the forum state, including the distribution of goods there. E.g,, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-75.4(4) (1969); 12 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1701.3(a)(4) (1961). The Oklahoma version,
however, was also satisfied if a defendant "derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed . . . in this state," and on this basis the Oklahoma courts held that the two appealing
defendants could be subjected to Oklahoma's jurisdiction. 585 P.2d 351, 354-55 (Okla. 1978).

67. 100 S. Ct. at 564.
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ing its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as
an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest
the State of its power to render a valid judgment.68
The state courts had grounded their claim of jurisdiction principally upon the assumption that a car Sold anywhere in America might
forseeably be used in Oklahoma. 69 The Court, however, rejected the
claim that "foreseeability alone" was a sufficient jurisdictional basis,
noting that is was equally foreseeable that the settlor in Hanson and the
wife and children in Kulko would move to another state. 70 Furthermore, under such a test products liability jurisdiction would automatically follow the chattel wherever it was taken, just as garnishment
jurisdiction had automatically followed the debtor in the days before
Shaffer v. Heitner.71 Thus, the Court concluded, the foreseeability that
a product will find its way into the forum State is not critical. "Rather
it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being hailed into court
72
there."
This twist on the "foreseeability" test is not particularly illuminating. Its purport, however, was made quite clear. A manufacturer or
distributor is subject to jurisdiction in any state in which it makes efforts, directly or indirectly, to market its products, including their delivery "into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State."73 In other words, every
person in the chain of distribution is presumptively amenable to jurisdiction on a products liability claim wherever the goods passing
through his hands are eventually sold to consumers in the ordinary
course of business. 74 Since the Atlantic regional distributor and the
New York dealer sold no cars in or near Oklahoma, they could not be
sued there.
68. Id. at 565-66 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945);
citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 254).
69. Id. at 563.
70. Id. at 566.
71. Id. at 566-67.
72. Id. at 567 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 567 (suggesting comparison with Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961)).
74. Id. at 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting). If these requirements are met, it should not matter
that a defendant did not in fact know that the goods had been sold in the forum state or that they

were not promoted or serviced therein, but see Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.) (en
banc) (4-3 decision), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 573 (1978), or that the defective product had actually
arrived in the forum state outside the normal distribution process, see Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
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In dissent, Justice Brennan characterized the majority's formulation as a mechanical test focusing too narrowly upon the quantum of
contacts between the forum state and the defendant and giving insufficient weight to the interests of the other parties and the forum state and
the amount of inconvenience the defendant might suffer in litigating
away from home.75 In addition, he thought that the mobility of the
automobile made its use in Oklahoma especially foreseeable and,
therefore, the case for jurisdiction particularly appealing.76 Finally, he
could find no clear constitutional distinction "between a case involving
goods which reach a distant State through a chain of distribution and a
case involving goods which reach the same State because a consumer,
' 77
using them as the dealer knew the customer would, took them there.
78
Rush v. Savchuk

E

In this case, a companion to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., the
Supreme Court finally considered the validity of the much discussed
doctrine of Seider v. Roth,7 9 under which a liability insurance policy
was regarded as a debt owed to the insured and subject to garnishment
by anyone asserting a claim against him covered by the policy. In theory, such quasi-in-rem jurisdiction could have been asserted wherever
the insurance company did business. In practice, however, it was allowed only in the state in which the plaintiff resided.80 In addition, a
resulting judgment could be satisfied only out of the proceeds of the
policy8l and had no res judicata or collateral estoppel effects even if a
75. 100 S.Ct. at 581 (dissenting opinion). This position is, of course, essentially identical to
the one taken by Justice Brennan in Shaffer and Hanson.

76. Id. at 584. This argument, which was also made by Justices Marshall, id. at 569 (dissenting opinion), and Blackmun, id. at 571 (dissenting opinion), in their separate dissenting opinions,
is forensically appealing, but is basically a makeweight. The automobile has long been a likely

protagonist in cases extending state jurisdiction, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), but it
is invariably the beginning of, rather than the occasion for, the extension. Thus, if the Court was

not prepared to allow portable tort jurisdiction in nonvehicular cases, it was correct in denying
jurisdiction in vehicular cases as well.

77. 100 S.Ct. 584-85 (dissenting opinion). Justice Blackmun also made this point in his
dissenting opinion. Id. at 571 (dissenting opinion). This is certainly a valid point that the majority did not answer directly. One possible answer is to be found in the discussion in section III. C.

infra.
78. 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
79. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
80. See, e.g., Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
81. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669 (1967), reh'g denied, 21 N.Y.2d
990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (assuming the unconstitutionality of the Seider
attachment if a defense on the merits by defendant amounted to a general appearance).
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full defense on the merits was made.8 2
The Seider doctrine effectively permitted a plaintiff to litigate in
his home state and under its substantive law13 against a nonresident
defendant with respect to a foreign accident.8 4 Having successfully sur-

vived all initial constitutional challenges,85 it was clearly placed in new
jeopardy when Harrisv. Balk,8 6 on which it relied, was overruled by
Shaffer v. Heitner. 7 Nevertheless, its validity was still proclaimed by
many commentators,8 8 by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, 9 and by the highest courts of New York 90 and Minne-

sota,91 principally because an insurance obligation, unlike the debt garnished in Harris v. Balk, was related to a plaintiffs underlying claim

against a defendant and, therefore, together with a plaintiff's residence
in the forum state, provided the minimum contacts required to sustain
a judgment limited to the proceeds of the policy. 92
After denying certiorari in many of the New York and Second
Circuit cases,9 3 the Supreme Court finally agreed to review the decision
of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Savchuk v. Rush.9 4 It reversed,
82. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969).
83. See cases cited note 10 supra.
84. In situations in which both parties potentially had claims against each other, such as in
vehicular collisions, the prospective Seider defendant could bar a Seider action by suing first in
the state in which the accident occurred because the Seider-based claim would be a compulsory
counterclaim in that action. By contrast, the prospective Seider defendant's claim would not be a
compulsory counterclaim in a prior Seider action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(2). Thus, it could still
be separately brought and, if litigated to judgment first, could be used for collateral estoppel purposes in the Seider action. A prior Seider judgment, however, could not be so employed. See text
accompanying note 82 supra. Thus, the Seider doctrine encouraged a race to the courthouse door
and to judgment and made multiple lawsuits and inconsistent judgments a strong possibility. Although these undesirable results do not go to the question ofjurisdiction vel non, they offer additional reasons to applaud Seider's demise.
85. E.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969).
86. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
87. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
88. See e.g., Dooling, Seider v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 505
(1979); Silberman, supra note 10, at 90-99.
89. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034
(1978).
90. Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110 (1978).
91. Savchuk v. Rush, 245 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902
(1977), aF'donremand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
92. Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571, 575-76 (1980). See generally Silberman, supra note 10,
at 92-97.
93. E.g., Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840
(1969); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
94. 245 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976), vacated and remanded,433 U.S. 902 (1977), a]7'd on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980). It is ironic that the Supreme
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holding that the Seider attachment, which in that case was typical in
all respects but one,9 5 did not satisfy the minimum contacts require-

ment. Neither defendant nor the accident had any connection with
Minnesota. Therefore, the only affiliating circumstance was provided
by defendant's insurance company, which did business there. But the
company's "decision to do business in Minnesota was completely adventitious as far as [defendant] was concerned."9 6 He had no control
over the decision and had no expectation that by buying insurance in

one state he would be subject to jurisdiction in any state in which a
claimant resided and his insurance company did business. 97 Furthermore, defendant's insurance company did business all over America.

Consequently, "[u]nder appellee's theory the 'debt' owed to [defendant]
would be 'present' in each of those jurisdictions simultaneously. It is
apparent that such a 'contact' can have no jurisdictional significance." 98
Finally, the Court stated, neither the insurance policy nor the company's preeminent role in the litigation could supply the necessary con-

tacts. The policy was not the subject of the action or related in any way
to its operative facts, as is the case in true in rem cases, and the contractual relationship it created between insurer and insured pertained "only
to the conduct, not the substance of the litigation." 99
The Court also rejected the alternative argument that a Seider ac-

tion could be regarded as the equivalent of a common-law direct action
against the insurer alone because the insured "nominal defendant" has
Court heard the Minnesota case after refusing to hear so many cases from New York and the
Second Circuit in which the Seider attachment had also been challenged. Perhaps it had been
hoping that the contagion would not spread, 100 S.Ct. at 576, since, prior to Savchuk, only one
state other than New York had gdopted the doctrine, and only in a limited retaliatory way, see
Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973) (adopting the Seider doctrine only when
defendant resides in a Seider jurisdiction).
95. Plaintiff Rush had moved to Minnesota after the accident occurred. 100 S. Ct. at 574.
With one narrow exception, id. at 577, the Court made no mention of this fact, which it presumably considered inconsequential. Whether this minor deviation will be clutched at by diehards
remains to be seen.
96. Id.
97. Id. This language fails to resolve the question whether an attachment of non-transient
property, such as realty or a bank account, with respect to an unrelated cause of action meets
Shaffer's requirements. See Silberman, sujra note 10, at 67-77. In such cases, the defendant has
personally made the contact with the forum and retains control with respect to that contact. See,
e.g., Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But since the plaintiff's residence is irrelevant, the property's presence would then provide minimum contacts for anyone in
the world to sue the defendant on any cause of action. That result seems offensive to Rush's
general tone. Of course, it would still be possible to find that the contacts are sufficient but reject
jurisdiction as unfair or inconvenient because the plaintiff is not a resident of the forum state, See
text accompanying notes 104-06 in/r.
98. 100 S. Ct. at 578.
99. Id.
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no real stake in its outcome. 10 The direct action statutes previously
upheld required that the accident have occurred or that the defendant
be domiciled in the forum state, which therefore, had jurisdiction over
the defendant anyway.' 01 Such contact, the Court concluded, is an an-

alytical prerequisite of a direct action and is clearly lacking in typical
Seider actions.'0 2 Minnesota had improperly sought to remedy this deinficiency by attributing the unilateral actions of the insurer to 0 the
3
sured, who lacked his own necessary contacts with the forum.'
In closing, the Court noted that the justifications offered in support
of the Seider doctrine share a common characteristic: they shift the
focus of the jurisdictional inquiry away from the contacts of the de-

fendant with the forum to the contacts and interests of the plaintiff, the
insurer and the forum." 4 Such an approach, said the Court, is forbidden under the minimum contacts analysis. Defendant must first be

shown to have certain judicially cognizable ties with the forum. Only
thereafter do these other considerations come into play, and then only

to determine "whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "105 In other
words, these other factors may confirm or defeat jurisdiction, but they
may not create it.
These closing remarks assert premises totally at odds with the

modem balancing approach used to justify Seider.10 6 They also restate
the essence of the Court's now familiar theory of jurisdiction, which

originated with Hanson v. Denckla but which, until now at least, has
not been taken seriously by everyone. Why that was so is not alto100. In a footnote the Court questioned the assumption that the insured has no real stake in
the outcome of the Seider litigation. Id. at 579 n.20.
101. Id. at 578-79 (citing Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 579.
104. Id. This shift is illustrated by those cases suggesting that it would be unconstitutional to
permit a nonresident plaintiff to bring a Seider action, see, e.g., Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d
138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977), and thereby implying that "plaintiffs contacts with
the forum are decisive in determining whether the defendant's due process rights are violated."
Id.
105. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.310, 316 (1945)).
106. See text accompanying note 92 supra. This may also explain the Court's conclusory rejection of some of the pro-Seider contentions. Thus, it dismissed the direct action justification
simply on the authority of Watson v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), see
text accompanying note 101 supra, without making an effort to deal with the arguments that have
been made to bridge the difference between that case and Seider, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg,
410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969), cited with approval in 100 S.Ct. at
580 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These arguments are founded, however, on the now rejected assumption that the interests of the plaintiff and the forum state are initially relevant to the question of
jurisdiction vel non.
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gether clear. Perhaps only in hindsight is the Court's message so unequivocal. In any event, there is no mistaking the Court's present
resolve or any mystery about why it heard and decided Rush and
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. together.
III.

COMMENTARY

The line of cases beginning with Hanson v. Denckla and continuing .through the Court's recent pronouncements in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. and Rush mandates a bifurcated jurisdictional inquiry,
beginning with a straightforward examination of defendant's contacts
with the forum state.17 This threshold examination is surely the cutting edge of the Court's approach and the likely source of whatever, if
any, additional jurisdictional pruning that takes place. Where that will
or may be is not altogether clear, however, 0 8 or amenable to careful
examination in this brief comment. Therefore, I shall leave that question to others and turn directly to my principal concern-the possible
explanations of and justifications for the Supreme Court's strict jurisdictional approach.
To begin with, the approach is consistent with the Burger Court's
generally conservative bent and its concern for property' 0 9 and business rights" 0 and state sovereignty."' Such broad generalizations are,
however, of limited analytic utility. Therefore, let me narrow the focus
to three distinct inquiries: (1) why an initiative by the Court in the
jurisdictional area was inevitable and necessary; (2) what specific factors were most influential in the actual decisions; and (3) what additional justifications there may be for the Court's adherence to such a
rigid, mechanical view of jurisdiction.
107. If the minimum contacts requirement is satisfied, then all other considerations become
relevant to the question of whether it is fair and reasonable to assert jurisdiction in the case. See
text accompanying note 105 supra.
108. None of the more familiar long-arm provisions appear to be in jeopardy. Some of the

cases employing the so-called "effects" test, however, especially those involving economic effects,
would now appear to be questionable. See generally Comment, supranote 9, and cases cited note
63 supra.
109. See, e.g., Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
110. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
111. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). These cases and others like them hold that the states are, as partially
sovereign entities, either immune from certain federal powers or not automatically preempted by

them. The jurisdiction cases represent, in effect, the other side of the coin. Thus, the states as
sovereign entities are correspondingly saddled with jurisdictional limitations inherent in their territorial boundaries. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 565.
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Reasonsfor the Court'sInitiative

Under the Constitution the Supreme Court is the neutral enforcer
of the due process and full faith and credit clauses, which are direct
limitations on state judicial authority.' 12 From 1945 to 1957, however,
with the announcement and expansion of the minimum contacts test,
the Court acted more as a pathfinder than as a policeman. 1 3 As the
new jurisdictional boundaries were generally marked out, however,
and state courts began to test their specific limits, the Court was bound
to revert back gradually to its traditional role. It did so briefly with the
decision in Hanson v. Denckla, but then it inexplicably left the field for
almost twenty years to the lower courts and the scholars, many of
whom were not exactly taken with Hanson.1 14 Indeed that decision was
so thoroughly discredited and the opposite viewpoint so firmly entrenched by the seventies" 5 that the Court's initial efforts in Shaffer
and Kulko to reverse the trend were largely ineffectual. Consequently,
the Court had to do something dramatic to reassert its doctrinal hegemony and traditional enforcement role in this area. It very effectively
chose as its vehicle the companion decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. and Rush.
In addition, the Court's long period of inaction may have been
interpreted by the state courts as a signal that the due process clause
had become merely a ritualistic limitation on their jurisdiction. In
Shaffer, for example, the Court unanimously agreed that in rem jurisdiction was governed by the minimum contacts approach, and in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. even the dissenters conceded that the
case approached the limits of due process." 6 The respective state
supreme courts, however, had either ignored or summarily dismissed
these due process contentions." 7 Such total insensitivity to constitutional questions is perhaps atypical of state appellate courts, at least in
the jurisdictional area. On the other hand, it may have been symptomatic of a feeling that almost any colorable assertion of jurisdiction
would pass muster in the permissive climate that then prevailed. If that
112. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
113. See cases cited note 1 supra.
114. See, e.g., Hazard, A GeneralTheory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241,
243-44 (P. Kurland ed.).
115. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 32, at 1164-79.
116. 100 S. Ct. at 568, 585.
117. Eg., Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976) (rejecting the due process

minimum contacts contention summarily); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d
351 (Okla. 1978) (totally ignoring the due process contention).
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was so, it was in large part the fault of the Supreme Court, which has
now properly reminded the states that the limits of due process are real.
The Court's resurgence is also attributable to certain specific juris-

dictional developments. One obvious example is provided by Shaffer
and Rush. The theoretical basis of quasi-in-rem attachment jurisdic-

tion, which had become increasingly unnecessary and unfair as longarm jurisdiction expanded,I 8 had been directly undercut by the concept of minimum contacts.' 1 9 Nevertheless, despite frequent suggestions to this effect in the legal literature,1 20 not a single state court had

so held, and those to which the contention was advanced generally rejected it summarily.' 2' Furthermore, some states were not content to
leave well enough alone, but actually expanded attachment jurisdiction
by combining it with other questionable doctrines.'12 Perhaps that is
why the Court did not simply weed out these mutant strains but chose
to extirpate the genus almost entirely.
A second example is provided by Hanson and Rush and the now

abortive marriage of jurisdiction and choice-of-law. Some states, most
notably New York under Seider, have found "minimal" contacts to be

a sufficient basis both for asserting jurisdiction and applying their own
substantive law to the foreign transaction or occurrence. 23 Although
the choice-of-law decisions were also subject to constitutional review
and offered an alternative solution to the perceived problem, their validity was usually assumed and then effectively undercut by the finding
that jurisdiction was lacking. 24 Whichever way was better ' 2'-and the
choice has, of course, now been made-it required the Court's intervention because the state courts were not totally disinterested parties to
118. Carrington, The Modern Uility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdicion, 76 HARv. L. REV. 303
(1962).
119. Silberman, supra note 10, at 34-35, 64-65.
120. See, e.g., id. at 65 n.174.
121. Id. at 35 n.4. The state courts have similarly failed to question transient in personam or
so-called "tag" jurisdiction, despite the widespread feeling that its days are also numbered. See
Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 15, 24 (1978).
122. The Seider doctrine is one obvious example. Another is the Delaware stock situs statute
utilized in Shaffer, see note 36 supra, which permits suit in Delaware against a shareholder in a
Delaware corporation on a cause of action totally unrelated to the ownership of the stock. See
Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 290 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1972).
123. See cases cited note 10 supra.
124. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 10.
125. Arguably it is simpler to control the problem by focusing on the single jurisdictional
question, however factually variegated it may be, than on the "multitudinous phases of the conflict of laws." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24, Comment c (1971).
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the problem and their union of these two concepts was arguably straining the limits of due process.
The last example is provided by World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
and Kulko. The lower court decisions in these cases were illustrative of
a new kind of jurisdictional approach. Prior to these cases, it had long
been settled that a defendant was generally subject to long arm jurisdiction in any forum in which he conducted or permitted the conduct
of his affairs on causes of action. arising out of them.126 World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. and Kulko, however, were representative of a class
of cases in which it was asserted that, under the so-called "effects" or
"forseeability" test, a defendant was also subject to jurisdiction in additional forums in which his affairs had not been conducted but in which
their impact was forseeably felt.'1 7 It was this assertion that was rejected by the Court's decisions in Kulko and World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. in terms that call into question the usefulness of the "effects" test
itself. The merits of this result will be considered below. For the moment it is sufficient to note that these cases as a class clearly implicated
the outer limits of due process and, therefore, provided a compelling
justification for the Court's belated reentry into the jurisdictional fray.
B. Specfic FactorsAffecting the Results
In Hanson and the Court's four most recent jurisdiction cases, the
forum state asserted jurisdiction with respect to a transaction or occurrence that took place, at least initially, outside its borders. In rejecting
each assertion and the justifications offered in support of it, the
Supreme Court relied upon a number of common arguments that offer
important insights into its current jurisdictional state of mind.
In the typical Seider action, and in Shaffer, plaintiff currently resided or was incorporated in the forum state. In Hanson, Kulko and
Rush plaintiff, or plaintiff s decedent, subsequently established residence there. The Court, however, held that the plaintiffs residence is
connot a contact of the defendant and is irrelevant unless minimum
28
tacts on the part of the defendant are first found to exist.'
In Shaffer and Rush, defendant also had an interest in property
126. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 32, at 1148-53. The one notable exception was the case involving the non-resident mail order buyer. E.g., Fourth N.W. Nat'l Bank
v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250,
342 P.2d 871 (1959).
127. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 37, Reporters Note
(1971); Comment, supra note 9; authorities cited notes 59-63 supra.
128. Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. at 579.
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allegedly situated in the forum state. In neither, however, did the claim
asserted against him arise directly out of that interest, although in Rush
the two were related.129 The absence of such a linkage may eventually
be found fatal to any assertion of in rem jurisdiction. 3 ° For the moment, however, it is at least clear that, if the interest was acquired
outside the forum state and the property is not uniquely situated
therein,' the interest will not provide the necessary contacts to sustain
jurisdiction over an unrelated cause of action. Otherwise a promisee or
debtor could unilaterally create jurisdiction anywhere or everywhere he
goes or does business.'3 2 Such "contacts," the Court has concluded,
"can have no jurisdictional significance."' 33 Like a plaintiff's choice of
residence, they are, from the defendant's perspective, "adventitious,"134
totally beyond his control,' 35 36and, though often foreseeable, not for his
direct or immediate benefit.

These considerations are also applicable to the portable tort, products liability cases exemplified by World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. To
the defendant, the movements of the product after it has been sold at
retail, though often foreseeable, are again adventitious, uncontrollable
and not beneficial 137, and, if used as the basis for asserting jurisdiction,
of potential jurisdictional significance throughout the nation. By contrast, if the defendant has been involved in the distribution of goods to
the forum state, his contacts with it are volitional and financially beneficial. Furthermore, he can presumably ascertain where the goods are
129. In Rush, the Court said: "The insurance policy is not the subject matter of the case,
however, nor is it related to the operative facts of the negligence action. [It] pertain[s] only to the
conduct, not the substance of the litigation .
100 S.Ct. at 578.
130. See note 97 .upra.
131. This describes the situations in Shaffer and Rush, in which shares of stock and an insurance policy, respectively, were purchased outside the forum state and, unlike a local bank account
or realty, were not uniquely situated therein.
132. Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. at 578.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 577.
135. Id.
136. In his dissenting opinion to both Rush and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., Justice Brennan noted that an interstate insurance company benefits its policy holders, who may more easily
make claims or conduct business with it away from home. Id. at 583 (dissenting opinion). Such a
collateral benefit is hardly direct or immediate, however, and is one over which the defendant has
little or no control. Cf.World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 568
("[W]hatever marginal revenues [defendants] may receive because their products are capable of
use in [a state] is far too attenuated a contact to justify that State's exercise ofinpersonamjurisdiction over them.")
137. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., the dissenters noted that each dealer or distributor of a
nationally sold, serviced and advertised product benefits from that fact. 100 S.Ct. 559, 585 (dissenting opinion). The majority, however, found these collateral benefits "too attenuated a contact." Id at 568.
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bound and object or make other arrangements if the resulting multistate jurisdictional exposure is unacceptable.' 38 Thus, he is hardly at the
mercy of "It]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
39
with [him]."'
The decisions in Hanson and Kulko also reflect these considerations. In Hanson, the principal affiliating circumstance was the settlor's
execution of the power of appointment in Florida after she had moved
there. 40 That act was not done by, for or under the control of defendant, however, and could just as well have been done elsewhere. In
Kulko, the affiliating circumstance was defendant's acquiescence in his
daughter's decision to live in California with her mother, who had
moved there.' 4 1 Defendant, however, did not seek, desire or directly
benefit from that decision.' 42 And, although he might have resisted it,
ultimately he had little control over it. Consequently, his acquiescense
and participation in the decision was not a sufficiently beneficial or volitional act to give California jurisdiction over him. Again jurisdiction
was improperly based upon the "unilateral activity of those who claim
some relationship with a non-resident defendant."' 4 3
In one sense, however, Hanson and Kulko were different from the
others. The relationship between the parties in both was continuing
and, therefore, defendant had some limited contact with the forum
state after plaintiff moved there.'" The claim asserted did not arise
directly out of this continuing relationship, however, 145 but out of the
original underlying transaction. 146 Consequently, defendant's contacts
138. Id. at 567.
139. Id.
140. 357 U.S. at 253.
141. 436 U.S. at 94.
142. Id. at 94-95. The Court noted that defendant's continuing obligation to support his child
was not at issue, only California's jurisdiction to determine that support obligation. Id. at 94-96.
Thus, defendant's temporary freedom from the expense of supporting his daughter while she resided in California did not benefit him sufficiently for jurisdictional purposes. Finally, the child's
right to use California public services was a benefit to her, not to him. Id. at 94 n.7.
143. Id. at 93-94 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253).
144. In Hanson, the trustee had remitted trust income to the settlor in Florida and had corresponded with her concerning the administration of the trust. 357 U.S. at 252. In Kulko, the father
had each summer sent the children and the agreed upon support payment to the mother in California. 436 U.S. at 93.
145. A claim by the settlor against the trustee for trust income not remitted or a claim by the
mother against the father for failure to send the agreed upon support payments would have arisen
directly out of these limited activities. As to whether the state court would have had jurisdiction in
these cases, see note 149 infra.
146. In Hanson, the litigation concerned the validity of the trust itself and the disposition of
the assets after the settlor's death, 357 U.S. at 238; in Kulko, plaintiff sought to alter, not enforce,
the support agreement, 436 U.S. at 88.
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were deemed insufficient to support jurisdiction over the claim asserted. 4 7 Otherwise the simple act of sending children or money into
the forum state would potentially create jurisdiction over the sender
with respect to almost any aspect of the underlying relationship. 148
policy consequences
That possibility, however, had such undesirable
149
that jurisdiction could not be permitted.
In effect, what the Court has done in these cases is to turn the clock
back to an earlier time when jurisdiction, like substantive tort law, was
concerned more with the defendant's conduct and less with notions of
social welfare and convenient risk allocation.150 A defendant must now
act with respect to the forum state or have some control over and derive
some benefit from the acts of those for which he is to be jurisdictionally
charged. If the affiliating acts are limited in scope or territory, the jurisdictional risk will be correspondingly limited to claims arising specifically from them' 5 ' and to forums directly involved or affected. 5 ' Acts
that supposedly amount to a consent to jurisdiction anywhere or everywhere the plaintiff or some third person resides, goes or transacts busi147. In Kulko, the Supreme Court of California also agreed that this was not a sufficient basis
forjurisdiction. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 519, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 590, 564 P.2d 353, 357 (1977).
148. Kulko v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. at 93; see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
100 S. Ct. at 566.
149. In Kulko, the Court feared that the supporting spouse might otherwise eschew voluntary
support or visitation arrangements, lest his assent subject him to jurisdiction wherever his spouse
resided, to the greater detriment of harmonious family arrangements. 436 U.S. at 93. Hanson did
not discuss the obvious problem of subjecting a trustee to lawsuits questioning the administration
or validity of a trust in every state where beneficiaries reside, perhaps because even the possibility
presents such a procedural nightmare. These factors help to distinguish Hanson and Kulko from
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), in which the Supreme Court held that
an insurance company, or one that succeeded to its obligations, was subject to jurisdiction in an
action on a policy in any state in which the insured resided when the policy was issued, even
though the company transacted and solicited no other business in the state and had no office or
agents there. In that situation, the claim arose directly out of the limited business done within the
state, and the assertion of jurisdiction over defendant had no socially onerous side effects.
Whether McGee is authority for the assertion of jurisdiction in the hypothetical cases set forth in
note 145 supra, is a nice question that need not be answered here. In any event, McGee is not
necessarily inconsistent with Hanson or Kulko.
150. Needless to say the clock has been turned back, or perhaps merely stopped, only with
respect to jurisdiction and not with respect to substantive tort law, which is a separate question
even though some of the underlying policy considerations are similar. Thus, even if the Court had
constitutional authority to curtail the parallel developments in state products liability law, it has
not even hinted that it would be so inclined. Indeed, unless it were prepared to hold, contrary to
the unequivocal language in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp., see notes 59 & 60 supra, that manufacturers and distributors generally could not be sued even in states where their goods were actually sold, it could not logically even contemplate the equivalent substantive result. Therefore,
although some of the justifications presented here for the jurisdictional result logically could be
used to assail the substantive one, they are not so intended and should not be so interpreted.
151. See note 149 sufpra.
152. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 564-65.
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ness are generally regarded as jurisdictionally irrelevant.153

Under such a conduct-oriented approach to minimum contacts, a
defendant who travels from his home or place of business to that of the
plaintiff is clearly required to return again to answer for his conduct
there.15 4 Similarly, a defendant who. solicits or initiates interstate sales

transactions by carrier, mail or telephone must ordinarily litigate wherever his customers live.' 55 Thus, the question of who went to whom
and who was the aggressor has traditionally been a relevant question in
jurisdictional inquires.' 56 In these recent cases, however, the peripa-

tetic party is a plaintiff who deals with a defendant at the latter's home
or place of business, moves away and then expects the defendant to
come to him or her.' 57 That this expectation proved to be erroneous is
in retrospect not surprising. On the other hand, it is also not surprising
that the state courts and many commentators thought otherwise. Their
position was that litigation away from home is less costly and inconvenient today. Furthermore, the defendants and insurance companies of
today are usually financially better prepared to undertake such litiga-

tion and can normally budget for the extra cost in their prices or
rates.' 58 These assertions are obviously true. Their significance, however, is another matter. The decreasing inconvenience of litigation

away from home also applies to plaintiffs. In addition, plaintiffs as a
group are no longer as helpless as they perhaps once wereJ 59 Today,
153. Id. at 566; Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. at 578.
154. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 32, at 1148.
155. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). As a general rule, a consumer who
in response to advertisements initiates a mail order transaction is not regarded as an aggressor.
See cases cited at note 138 infra. Furthermore, in the absence of advertisements or other solicitation, a consumer who in fact initiates a mail order transaction may still not have sufficient contacts
with the seller's state.
156. Fourth N.W. Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962);
Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 32,
at 1167-69. This distinction also helps to explain the much maligned decision in Erlanger Mills,
Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), in which the defendant, at plaintiff's
request, shipped a single order of goods, which were later found to be defective, into the forum
state.
157. Thus, in Kulko, the Court noted that plaintiff "seeks modification of a contract that was
negotiated in New York and that she flew to New York to sign," and that defendant "has remained in the State of the marital domicile, whereas [plaintiff] has moved across the continent."
436 U.S. at 97.
158. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. at 570 (dissenting opinion).
159. Many injured plaintiffs once were forced either to settle claims prematurely in order to
pay their bills or to seek advances for living expenses from their attorneys, a practice that raised
serious professional responsibility questions. See M. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CASES AND MATERIALS 580-88 (1979). Today, however, the problem apparently arises
far less frequently.
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many are protected by public and private health, disability, income
maintenance and legal service schemes, including the contingent fee
arrangement, and are better able to seek and obtain effective legal redress. That does not mean, of course, that all plaintiffs can comfortably
litigate away from home today or that defendants as a class are still not
better able to do so. It does suggest, however, that a strong jurisdictional bias in plaintiffs favor is perhaps no longer truly essential and
that the more neutral position to which
the Court has moved will not
160
deprive many of them of a remedy.

C. Other fus~fcationsfor the Court'sApproach
The real difference between the Supreme Court's jurisdictional approach and the alternative balancing approach of Justice Black and
other advocates is in the importance assigned to factors and interests
other than the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Under the
balancing approach, these other factors and interests enjoy relatively
co-equal status with those of the defendant.' 6 1 Under the Court's approach, however, they are of secondary importance and can only confirm or defeat, but never themselves create, jurisdiction. 62 The reason
for the difference is not altogether clear. Neither the federal system, t63
constitutional text, prior precedent or ineluctable logic mandated this
difference. Nor was it essential to the specific results reached in the
cases. The Court could just as well have restruck the balance itself and
found it lacking. Moreover, the balancing test is hardly inherently in160. Perhaps some very small or marginal claims will not survive the trip to the place of the
occurrence or to the defendant's residence or place of business. That, however, is arguably one of
the hazards of traveling or doing business away from home. Furthermore, these claims are the
kind that unscrupulous plaintiffs, if allowed to sue at home, could use to hold up even insurance
companies, which, despite their large resources, often find it more economical to settle unreasonably than to litigate expensively, especially in a distant forum.
161. In his dissenting opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., Justice Brennan said:
In answering the question whether or not it is fair and reasonable to allow a particular forum to hold a trial binding on a particular defendant, the interests of the forum
State and other parties loom large in today's world and surely are entitled to as much
weight as are the interests of the defendant.
100 S. Ct. at 586 (dissenting opinion).
162. Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. at 579; see text accompanying notes 104-106 supra.
163. The very existence of long arm jurisdiction makes it clear that state boundaries have less
than paramount jurisdictional significance. The reason, as Professor Kurland reminds us, is that
for states in a federal system bound together by the full faith and credit clause, "[t]he real question
becomes not whether a state could itself enforce a judgment, but rather under what circumstances
the national power should be used to assist the extraterritorial enforcement of a state's judicial
decrees." Kurland, supra note 19, at 585. Obviously the national power should be withheld when
a defendant has no contacts with the forum state, which asserts what amounts to nationwide service of process. Beyond that, however, it is for the Court to decide what circumstances are relevant
to the existence of jurisdiction.
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imical to the achievement of proper case results. Indeed, by definition
it seeks the "just" result in every case, whereas the Court's more
mechanical approach obviously does not and cannot.
The explanation is, in my opinion, a more practical one. The
Court must set the limits of due process somewhere and no doubt believes that its mechanical approach will usually produce the right result, or will at least produce few very wrong and unfair ones. Thus,
justice would only rarely be served if the state courts were permitted to
search under a balancing approach for the random exception, which
they, in their obvious self-interest, would perhaps too often erroneously
purport to find. The potential sources of that self-interest are certainly
numerous. For example, an affirmative jurisdictional finding may (1)
allow the creation or augmentation of an estate or fund for tax or local
creditor purposes,64 (2) allow the assertion of state regulatory or taxing
authority,'6 5 (3) provide a local forum for state residents, (4) allow
more sympathetic, and possibly more liberal, local juries and judges to
decide issues and assess damages, 66 (5) allow the choice of local substantive law,' 67 and (6) obviate the need for local attorneys to seek out,
rely upon and divide their fees with out-of-state counsel. Aligned
against this formidable array are several countervailing forces; namely,
(1) the felt obligation of state judges to apply the Constitution correctly
and their desire to avoid embarrassing reversals by the Supreme Court,
(2) the conservatism of many state judges, (3) the fear of retaliatory
jurisdictional decisions by other states, 16 and (4) the fear that an aggressive local jurisdictional posture might drive some marginal business away from the state. Only the first two of these considerations
appear to be significant, and, although they probably exert some countervailing force, they cannot in my opinion totally neutralize the powerful local interest bias. In close cases, state courts will naturally tend
to resolve jurisdictional doubts in their own favor. And sooner or later
one will announce a significant advance that the others will soon be
164. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
165. Cf Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (state has jurisdiction over
nonresident mail-order health insurance company to enforce state permit requirements); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (state has jurisdiction over nonresident corporation to recover payments due to the state unemployment compensation fund.)
166. Cf. Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (plaintiffsued in New York on a Virginia tort
because he feared a local jury would be staggered by the amount in controversy).
167. See cases cited note 10 supra.
168. Eg., Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973) (adopting the Seider doctrine
if defendant resides in a Seider jurisdiction).
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pressed to follow.169 Thus, under the relentless prod of local interest,
the state's long arm will inevitably reach farther and farther.
For years this inexorable growth was benignly ignored by the
Supreme Court. When, however, it reached, and then arguably
breached, the limits of due process, as the four recent cases illustrate, it
had to be arrested. The problem was how. At best the Court can review only a handful of the many jurisdictional cases that otherwise
remediless defendants seek to bring before it each year. In addition,
these cases, once decided, often have only limited precedential value
because of the ease with which they can be distinguished from new
jurisdictional questions, which arise in an endless variety of factual
contexts. The problem is a difficult one under any circumstances. It
would be greatly exacerbated, however, if the state courts were permitted to use a broader balancing approach, which invites them to consider and weigh local interests, asserts that such interests are at least a
partial substitute for minimum contacts, complicates the review of any
decision reached because of the multitude of relevant factors to be
weighed, and thereby makes each decision reached potentially distinguishable from any other.
By contrast, the Court's approach spurns the lure of perfect justice
in favor of a bright line test that the states can more easily follow and
the'Court can more easily police. Although it is not a litmus paper test,
its initial focus on a single objective variable-the defendant's contacts
with the forum state-must simplify both its application and any subsequent appellate review. Such simplicity is always desirable if the attendant social welfare loss can be minimized. Arguably it has been.' 70
In any event, the Court thinks so, and it obviously does not wish to add
to its many tasks a continuing campaign to contain the jurisdictional
avarice of the states.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court no doubt felt that state long arm jurisdiction,
after thirty-five years of generally unrestricted growth, was finally
threatening to overreach the limits of due process and acted decisively
to contain it. By limiting the source of minimum contacts solely to the
169. For example, the seminal decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), gave rise to a host of similar products liability cases
around the country, culminating in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., and to the adoption of new
long arm provisions incorporating the result. See note 66 supra.
170. See note 160 supra.
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activities of defendants, it promulgated a strict jurisdictional approach
that tends to hold the state courts to the mark and more easily identifies
the occasions when they depart from it. In the process, it has probably
stunted the growth of long arm jurisdiction, ended the era that began
with the decision in InternationalShoe and the announcement of the
minimum contacts test, and ushered in a new period of comparative
jurisdictional quiescence.

